I’m encountering some kind of a paradigm shift. And being unable to let go of my old beliefs, it’s kind of an icky state i’m in. Or rather, i’m having trouble accepting the new belief. The gist of it is this:
Let’s say there was a robot. This robot is programmed with my memories, personality, and looks, acts and thinks exactly like me. The likeness goes right down to dna and the petty faults. And no one is able to tell the difference.
Since i’ve always asserted that my existence is pretty much summed up by my memories and personality encoded in my brain. Incidentally, that would also mean that if a robot possess the same memories and personality, that robot would, in essence, also be me.
But yet, i could hardly say that the robot is me. Coz if i were to stand in proximity to the robot, i would be able to see that we’re two separate persons, even if we’re identical.
But then i got round to thinking about teleportation pads. Where the mass of a person is disassembled in one location, and the information is transmitted to another location.
The teleportation device over the other side would then use the information received to reconstruct the person using atoms and molecules from the surrounding area.
Is such a person still the same person before teleportation? If something went wrong with the teleportation pads, and information was transmitted to the destination, but the system failed to disassemble the person at the source, then we would have the same problem, two separate but identical persons.
So far so good. But then i got round to thinking, about our biological bodies. We lose and gain cells everyday. Over the course of our lives, we probably lose and gain enough cells to replace our entire brain several times.
The dissonance here is what bugs me. If i’m losing and gaining brain cells everyday, and i still call me as me while this is happening, then why should i treat the person in the teleportation scenario any different. He’s getting his brain cells replaced with new cells that’s all, albeit in a more arbitrary manner.
I’m beginning to think that the only way to reconnect the disconnected is to not treat the separate bodies with identical mind as separate persons. It’s a little hard to conceive, a person with two bodies and two brains, which is why i find this paradigm shift particularly icky.
The sad conclusion is that both individuality and the biologicality (no such word) of an individual is of relatively little importance.